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Genetic Disease, Genetic Testing and the Clinician
Kelly C. Smith

Modern medicine emphasizes treatment of the sick. It is often said that the widespread
genetic testing soon to follow the completion of the Human Genome Project will usher in
a new era of preventive medicine. Such changes require new ways of thinking, however.
For example, there may be nothing clinically wrong with a healthy patient who requests
genetic testing, even if the tests reveal disease genes. Since all individuals have genetic
skeletons in their closets, it is important to be careful not to confuse having disease genes
with having the diseases that they cause.

Unfortunately, many in the public have

adopted a kind of genetic determinism that sees genes as destiny: for example, having the
gene associated with colon cancer means they will develop colon cancer. Physicians tend
to be more careful, yet even they are not immune to subtle versions of genetic
determinism.
One example of this is the uncritical categorization of certain diseases as “genetic”. In
fact, an adequate concept of genetic disease is extremely difficult to come by. The
simplest notion would require a 1:1 correspondence between a disease and its genes, but
this is the exception rather than the rule. For example, cystic fibrosis (CF) is often put
forward as a good example of a genetic disease, since it seems to result from mutations in
a single gene, CFTR. Even in this case, however, the exact relationship between CFTR
mutations and disease is not clear, as virtually every possible combination of sweat
chloride test results, genetic test results, and symptoms has been observed.[1] If a patient

presents with the classic symptoms of CF and is found to have a mutation in the CFTR
gene, the physician might understandably infer that the mutation caused the disease. But
if an asymptomatic patient is tested and it is discovered that he or she has a CFTR
mutation, it is unclear what this means. The doctor might tell the patient the gene is
abnormal and that he or she is likely to develop pulmonary problems, etc., but it’s not
really known whether even this qualified prognosis is true. This is because current
knowledge of CF is based largely on studies of people who have the disease. It is not yet
known how likely it is that someone would test positive for a CFTR mutation and remain
healthy all his or her life. The claim that these situations are rare is thus based on an
implicit genetic determinism and is not supported by the data. Such assumptions may be
harmful if, for example, they cause patients to make inappropriate treatment decisions.
Nevertheless, because they remain tacit and thus escape critical scrutiny, assumptions
like this are quite common.
Moreover, the causal role of a gene is typically less direct than in CF. Suppose a
woman from the general population, who is not otherwise at risk for breast cancer, tests
positive for the BRCA1 gene. She is likely to be told that she has an 85% lifetime risk of
developing breast or ovarian cancer. This is serious news, especially since it is offered in
the seemingly unassailable, quantitative language of science. However, the 85% figure is
actually based on cancer-gene covariance in families that have an unusually high
incidence of early onset breast cancer.[3] It’s an open question to what extent such
families accurately represent the general population. In these circumstances, should the
patient being tested even be given a numerical estimate of risk, knowing that quantitative
results relayed by a physician are often taken as absolute? The common intuition that

information is always harmless and desirable is defensible only if the information can be
used to make appropriate decisions. Surely, if a genetic test results in a patient
undergoing what later turns out to be an unnecessary radical mastectomy, the test
information can not be considered harmless.
One thing physicians can do for patients is direct them to trained genetic counselors
who will discuss the desirability and interpretation of genetic tests in detail.
Unfortunately, given the dearth of trained counselors and the pressures of managed care,
this is not always possible. Primary care physicians forced to deal with these new tests
thus have a two-fold responsibility. First, they must keep themselves up to date
concerning the complexities of gene-disease relationships, taking careful note of what is
still not known as well as what is known. Second, they must communicate this
information openly and honestly with the patient. In particular, physicians must be
prepared to debunk uncritical notions about the causal power of genes and even to argue
against the advisability of genetic testing, especially in situations where there is no clear
differential treatment based on what the tests reveal. It is better to admit to patients that
medical science can not yet answer their questions than to offer a false sense of certainty
through tacit endorsement of information of uncertain quality.
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